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The idea of Artificial Intelligence has captured our collective imagination for
many decades. Can behavior that we think of as intelligent be replicated on
a machine? If so, what consequences could this have for society? And what
does it tell us about ourselves as human beings? Besides being a long-running
topic of philosophical reflection and science fiction, AI is also a well-established
scientific research area. Many universities have AI research labs, usually housed
in computer science departments. The feats accomplished in such research have
generally been far more modest than those imagined in the movies. But over
time, the gap between reality and fiction has been closing. For example, self-
driving cars are now a reality. And the world outside academia has taken notice.
The commercial opportunities are endless and technology companies are in fierce
competition over the top AI talent. Meanwhile, there is a growing popular worry
about where this is all headed.
Most of the technical progress on AI is reported at scientific conferences on
the subject. These conferences have been running for decades and are attended
by a steady community of devoted researchers. But in recent years they have
also started to attract a broader mix of participants. At the 2016 conference
in Phoenix, one speaker was more controversial than any other in recent mem-
ory: Nick Bostrom. While the audience consisted mostly of computer scientists,
Bostrom is a philosopher who directs the Future of Humanity Institute at Ox-
ford. He recently made waves with his book Superintelligence [1]. In it, he con-
templates the problem that we may soon build AI that broadly exceeds human
capabilities, and considers what steps we can take now to ensure that the result
will be in our best interest. A key concern is that of an “intelligence explosion”:
if we are intelligent enough to build a machine more intelligent than ourselves,
then, so the thinking goes, surely that machine in turn would be capable of
building something even more intelligent, and so on. The phrase “technological
singularity” is sometimes also used to describe such runaway intelligence. Will
humanity be left in the dust? Will we be wiped out? Since the appearance of
∗An edited version of this article was published in the magazine Prospect under the title
“Artificial intelligence: where’s the philosophical scrutiny?” on May 4, 2016 [2]. I thank Tom
Dietterich and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for helpful feedback on earlier versions of this article.
1
Bostrom’s book, public figures including Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and Bill
Gates have warned of the risks of superintelligent AI. Musk even donated $10M
to the Boston-based Future of Life Institute, establishing a grants program to
ensure that AI remains beneficial. The topic has remained in the news, with, for
example, recently United Nations Chief Information Technology Officer Atefeh
Riazi joining the chorus emphasizing the risks of AI.
These concerns have mostly been raised by people outside the core AI re-
search community, which has not been very vocal in this debate. Some in the
community cautiously agree with some of the points; others dismiss them. As
an AI researcher myself, after Bostrom’s talk I saw a number of people express
their displeasure on social media, saying that giving him such a forum gives him
credibility that he does not deserve. Others emphasized open-mindedness, but
(as far as I saw) fell short of endorsing his ideas. But I assume that most in the
AI community shrugged and continued with their research as usual. Why? Do
AI researchers just not care about the future of humanity?
I think the real answer requires some familiarity with the history of AI re-
search, which took off in the fifties. Early research showed that computers could
do things that few at the time had expected, leading to excitement, optimism,
and promises of the moon. But limitations of this early work soon became ap-
parent. Approaches that produced impressive results on small, toy examples
simply would not scale to real-world problems. Also, the real world is messy
and ambiguous, and AI researchers struggle to this day with making their pro-
grams robust enough to handle this. This led to what was called an “AI winter”:
AI got a bad reputation in the academic community and funding was reduced.
In fact, this cycle repeated itself. AI researchers yearned for their work to be
scientifically rigorous and respected, and learned to be careful. Some sought
to dissociate themselves from the term “AI” altogether and instead associated
with more narrowly defined technical problems. For example, many researchers
in the machine learning community – which focuses on having computers learn
automatically from data how to make predictions and decisions – no longer
wanted to be considered “AI” researchers. Even most of the researchers that
did stick with the term started focusing on narrower problems, not only because
of perception issues but also for technical reasons: these problems seemed to be
important roadblocks for AI but were not easy to solve. Also, progress on their
solution often led to direct beneficial impact on society. For example, part of the
community has focused on automated planning and scheduling systems, which
have been used in a variety of applications, such as scheduling the observations
of the Hubble Space Telescope.
The AI community has also mostly avoided the philosophical issues. An
introductory AI course will typically spend a little time on basic philosophical
questions, such as those raised by Searle’s “Chinese Room Argument” [5]. In
this argument, someone who does not know Chinese at all sits in a room and has
an incredibly detailed step-by-step manual – read, a computer program – for
how to respond to Chinese characters slipped under the door, by drawing other
characters and slipping them back out. The manual is so good that from the
outside it appears that there is someone inside who speaks Chinese, no matter
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how sophisticated the questions posed. Now, we can ask whether there is any
real understanding of Chinese in the room. At first, it may appear that there is
not. But if not, then how could a computer, which operates similarly, ever have
any real understanding?
While some AI professors enjoy posing such conundrums in, for example,
the introductory lecture, after that the typical AI course – my own included –
will quickly move on to teaching technical material that can be used to create
programs that do something interesting, like playing the game of Connect Four.
After all, the course is generally taught in a computer science department, not
a philosophy department. Similarly, very little of the research presented at any
major AI conference is philosophical in nature. Most of it comes in the form
of technical progress – a better algorithm for solving an established problem,
say. This is where AI researchers believe they can make useful progress and win
respect in the eyes of their scientific peers, whether they feel the philosophical
problems are important or not.
All this explains some of the reluctance of the AI community to engage
with the superintelligence debate. It has fought very hard to establish it-
self as a respected scientific discipline, overcoming outside bias and its own
careless early claims. The mindset is that anything perceived as unsubstan-
tiated hype, or as being outside the realm of science, is to be avoided at all
costs. Tellingly, in a panel after Bostrom’s talk, Oren Etzioni, director of
the Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence, drew supportive laughs from the
crowd when he pointed out that Bostrom’s talk was blissfully devoid of any
data – even though Etzioni was quick to acknowledge that this was inherent in
the problem. Tom Dietterich, a computer science professor at Oregon State and
President of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, ex-
pressed skepticism that an intelligence explosion of the kind Bostrom describes
would happen, and asked what experiments we could run to test this hypothesis.
The AI community generally eschews speculation about the deep future and is
more comfortable engaging with important problems that are more concrete and
tangible at this point, such as autonomous weapons – weapon systems that can
act without human intervention – or the unemployment caused by AI replacing
human workers. The latter was, in fact, the topic of the panel.
Another issue is that AI researchers, perhaps unlike the general public, gen-
erally feel that there are still quite a few needed components missing before
something like the superintelligent AI of Bostrom’s book could possibly emerge.
Many of the problems that were once thought to be great benchmark problems
for AI – say, beating human champions at chess – ended up being solved us-
ing special-purpose techniques that, while impressive, could not immediately
be used to solve many other problems in AI, suggesting that the “hard prob-
lems” of AI lay elsewhere. (This has also led AI researchers to lament that
“once we solve something, it’s not considered AI anymore.”) So while recent
breakthroughs, such as Google DeepMind’s AI learning to play old Atari games
surprisingly well, may raise concern in the general public, perhaps AI researchers
have become accustomed to the idea that this just means the hard problems
must lie elsewhere. That being said, these results are certainly impressive to the
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AI community as well, not least because this time there are common techniques
– now generally referred to as “deep learning” – underlying not only the Atari
results, but also surprising progress in speech and image recognition. (Consider
the problems that Apple needs to solve to get Siri to understand what you said,
or that Facebook needs to solve to automatically recognize faces in the pictures
you upload.) Researchers had previously attacked these problems with separate
special-purpose techniques. And Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo program, which
recently defeated Lee Sedol, possibly the best human player, in the game of
Go, also has deep learning at its core. The techniques used for chess had been
largely ineffective on Go.
It is worth noting that the line of research that led to the deep learning results
had been largely dismissed by most AI and machine learning researchers, before
the few that tenaciously stuck with it started producing impressive results. So
our predictions about how AI will progress can be far off even in the very short
term. Accurately predicting all the way to, say, the end of the century seems
humanly impossible. If we go equally far into the past, we end up at a time
before even Alan Turing’s 1936 paper that laid the theoretical foundation for
computer science [6]. This, too, makes it difficult for mainstream AI researchers
to connect with those raising concerns about the future. Some disaster scenarios,
such as those related to asteroid strikes or global warming, allow for reasonable
predictions over such timescales, so it is natural to want the same for AI. But AI
researchers and computer scientists in general tend to reason over much shorter
timescales, which is already challenging given the pace of progress.
As one of the recipients of a Musk-funded Future of Life Institute grant, I
participated on a keeping-AI-beneficial panel in a workshop at the conference
in Phoenix. The panel was moderated by Max Tegmark, one of the founders
of the Future of Life Institute and a physics professor at MIT – again, an out-
sider to the AI community. Besides relatively more accessible questions about
autonomous weapons and technological unemployment, Tegmark also asked the
panel some philosophical questions. All other things being equal, would you
want your artificially intelligent virtual assistant (imagine an enormously im-
proved Siri) to be conscious? Would you want it to be able to feel pain? The first
question had no takers; some in attendance argued that pain could be beneficial
from the perspective of the AI learning to avoid bad actions. The substantial
philosophical literature on consciousness and qualia did not come up. (In phi-
losophy, the word “qualia” refers to subjective experiences, such as pain, and
more specifically to what it is like to have the experience. A famous example
due to the philosopher Thomas Nagel is that presumably, there is something it
is like to be a bat, though we, as a species that does not use echolocation, may
never know exactly what this is like [4]. Is there something it is like to be an AI
virtual assistant? A self-driving car?) Perhaps this was less due to unfamiliar-
ity with such concepts, and more due to discomfort with how to approach these
questions. Even philosophers have difficulty agreeing on the meaning of these
terms, and the literature ranges from the more scientifically oriented search for
the “neural correlates of consciousness” (roughly: what is going on in the brain
when conscious experience takes place) all the way to more esoteric studies of
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the subjective: how is it that my subjective experiences so appear so vividly
present, while yours do not? Well, surely your experiences appear similarly
somewhere else. Where? In your brain, as opposed to mine? But when we
inspect a brain, we do not find any qualia, just neurons. (If all this seems
hopelessly obscure to you, you are not alone – but if you are intrigued, see, for
example, Caspar Hare’s On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects [3] or
J.J. Valberg’s Dream, Death, and the Self [7].) The state of our understanding
makes it difficult even to agree on what exactly Tegmark’s questions mean – is
objectively assessing whether an AI virtual assistant has subjective experiences
a contradiction in terms? – let alone give actionable advice to AI practition-
ers. I believe philosophers do make progress on these issues, but it is slow and
hard-won. When discussing what philosophers are to do, Bostrom in his book
suggests to postpone work on “some of the eternal questions” for a while, and
instead to focus on how best to make it through the transition to a world with
superintelligent AI. But it is not entirely clear whether and how we can sidestep
the eternal questions in this endeavor, even if we accept the premise that such
a transition will take place. (Of course, philosophers do not necessarily accept
the premise either.)
So, generally, AI researchers prefer to avoid these questions and return to
making progress on more tractable problems. Many of us are driven to make
the world a better place – by reducing the number of deaths from automobile
accidents, increasing access to education, improving sustainability and health-
care, preventing terrorist attacks, etc. – and are a bit frustrated to see every
other article on AI in the news accompanied by an image from The Terminator.
Meanwhile, genuine concerns are developing outside the AI community. While
the AI conference in Phoenix was already underway, there was a call at a meet-
ing of the American Association for the Advancement of Science to devote 10%
of the AI research budget to the study of the societal impact of AI. Now, in a
climate where funding is already tight, diverting some of it may not make AI
researchers look more kindly on the people raising these concerns. But the AI
community should take part in the debate on societal impact, because without
it the debate will still take place and be less informed. Fortunately, members
of the community are increasingly taking an interest in short-to-medium-term
policy questions, including calling for a ban on autonomous weapons. Unfortu-
nately, we have yet to figure out how to rigorously and productively engage with
the more nebulous long-term philosophical issues. One area where some imme-
diate traction seems possible is the study of how (pre-superintelligence) AI can
make ethical decisions – for example, when a self-driving car needs to make a
decision in a scenario that is likely to kill or injure someone. In fact, automated
ethical decision making is the topic of a number of the Future of Life Institute
grants, including my own grant with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, a professor of
practical ethics and philosophy at Duke University. But at this point it is not
clear to AI researchers how to usefully address the notion of superintelligence
and the philosophical questions raised by it.
At the end of Bostrom’s talk, Moshe Vardi, a computer science professor at
Rice University, suggested that this all was very much as if upon Watson and
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Crick’s discovery of the structure of DNA, the focus had immediately been on
all the ways in which it could be abused. I think this is an excellent point.
Progress in AI will unfold in unexpected ways and some of the current concerns
will turn out to be unfounded, especially among those concerning the far off
future. But this argument cuts both ways; we can be sure that there are risks
that are not currently appreciated. It is not clear what exact course of action
is called for, but those that know the most about AI cannot be complacent.
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